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ExPLAInIng CRoSS-nATIonAL vARIATIonS  
In ThE PREvALEnCE And ChARACTER of undECLAREd 
EmPLoymEnT In ThE EuRoPEAn unIon
Abstract. The aim of this article is to evaluate the competing theories that variously explain the 
greater prevalence of undeclared employment in some countries either as: a legacy of under-devel-
opment; a result of the voluntary exit from declared employment due to the high taxes, state corrup-
tion and burdensome regulations and controls, or a product of a lack of state intervention in work 
and welfare which leads to the exclusion of workers from the declared economy and state welfare 
provision. Analyzing the cross-national variations in the prevalence of, and reasons for, undeclared 
employment across the European Union using evidence from a 2007 Eurobarometer survey, the 
finding is that undeclared employment is less prevalent and more of the voluntary variety in wealthi-
er, less corrupt and more equal societies possessing higher levels of social protection and redistribu-
tion via social transfers. The theoretical and policy implications are then discussed.
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1. InTRoduCTIon
Since the turn of the millennium in Europe, there has been growing recognition 
that undeclared employment not only lowers work quality standards and creates 
risks for the health and safety of workers, but also acts as a brake on economic 
growth, puts at greater risk the financial sustainability of social protection systems 
and undermines the legitimate business environment through unfair competition 
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(European Commission, 1998, 2003, 2007; Gallin, 2001; Williams and Renooy, 
2013). The result is that greater attention has started to be paid to not only under-
standing the prevalence of, and reasons for, undeclared employment (GHK and 
Fondazione Brodolini, 2009; Renooy et al., 2004; TNS Infratest et al., 2007) but 
also what needs to be done to tackle the undeclared economy (Dekker et al., 2010; 
European Commission, 1998, 2007a, b, 2012a, b; European Parliament, 2008; 
Williams and Renooy, 2013). The intention of this article is to further contribute 
to this emergent understanding by evaluating critically three competing theories 
that explain the cross-national variations in undeclared employment in Europe in 
different ways. 
To achieve this, the first section will briefly review the competing theories that 
variously explain the cross-national variations in the prevalence of, and reasons 
for, undeclared employment either as: a legacy of under-development (moderni-
sation perspective); an outcome of voluntary exit from declared employment due 
to the high taxes, state corruption and burdensome regulations and controls (neo-
liberal perspective), or a result of the lack of state intervention in labour markets 
and social protection which leads to the exclusion of workers from the declared 
economy and state welfare provision (political economy perspective). To evaluate 
critically the validity of these explanations, the second section will then report the 
methodology of the 2007 Eurobarometer survey here used to analyze the cross-
national variations in the prevalence of, and reasons for, undeclared employment 
in the EU-27 and the validity of the competing perspectives. In the third section, 
the descriptive results will be reported regarding the cross-national variations in 
the prevalence of, and reason for, undeclared employment followed in the fourth 
section by a critical evaluation of the competing theories that have sought to ex-
plain these cross-national variations. Finding a strong correlation between cross-
national variations in the prevalence of, and reasons for, undeclared employment 
across the EU-27 and cross-national variations in some of the societal characteris-
tics identified by each of the theoretical explanations but not others, the fifth and 
final section will then call for the adoption of a new ‘neo-modernisation’ perspec-
tive and tentatively discuss the policy implications of these findings.
In this paper, undeclared employment is defined as ‘productive activities that 
are lawful as regards their nature, but are not declared to the public authorities, 
taking into account the differences in the regulatory systems between member 
States’ (European Commission, 2007a, p. 1). As such, these are activities not de-
clared to the public authorities when they should be for tax, social security and la-
bour law purposes, but they are legal in all other respects (European Commission 
1998, 2007a, b; OECD 2012; Renooy et al., 2004; Pfau-Effinger, 2009; Sepulveda 
and Syrett, 2007; Williams, 2006). If the goods and services involved are illegal 
or the work is unpaid, these activities are not delineated as undeclared employ-
ment but rather, part of the ‘criminal’ or ‘unpaid’ economies respectively. There 
117Explaining Cross-National Variations in the Prevalence
are of course blurred edges, such as when gifts or in-kind labour are exchanged 
in lieu of money (White, 2009). Here, nevertheless, it is only deemed undeclared 
employment if money changes hands between the employer/purchaser and em-
ployee/supplier. 
Conventionally, only fully undeclared employment has been analyzed. This 
is where the employee is not in a declared employment relationship. Recently, 
however, especially in East-Central Europe, it has been recognized that declared 
employers sometimes pay a declared employee both a declared salary and an ad-
ditional undeclared (‘envelope’) wage (Karpuskiene, 2007; Neef, 2002; Sedle-
nieks, 2003; Williams, 2007, 2009, 2010; Williams and Padmore, 2013; Woolfson, 
2007). In this article therefore, not only wholly undeclared employment but also 
under-declared employment is considered.
2. ExPLAInIng CRoSS-nATIonAL vARIATIonS In undECLAREd  
EmPLoymEnT
It is now widely recognized that across the globe, undeclared employment is ex-
tensive and even growing relative to declared employment (Buehn and Schneider, 
2012; ILO, 2011; Jütting and Laiglesia, 2009; mehrotra and Biggeri, 2007; OECD 
2012; Schneider, 2008, 2011). However, it is also recognized that undeclared em-
ployment is unevenly distributed across different global regions (ILO, 2011) and 
cross-nationally (Buehn and Schneider, 2012; Feld and Schneider, 2010; ILO, 
2002; Schneider, 2011). Reviewing how this has been explained, three rival theo-
risations can be identified. Each is here briefly reviewed in turn. 
2.1. modernisation Perspective
Over the course of the 20th century, a common belief was that as economies 
developed, undeclared employment, which was viewed as a leftover from a pre-
modern mode of production, would recede and declared employment would be-
come ever more hegemonic as countries modernized. Undeclared employment 
was thus depicted as concentrated in less modern economies and a signal of their 
‘backwardness’ and ‘under-development’ (Geertz, 1963; Lewis, 1959). It became 
increasingly apparent however, that not all ‘under-developed’ economies were in-
deed making this transition towards a modern developed economy, as evidenced 
by the widespread persistence and even growth of undeclared employment which 
in many economies was found to be growing relative to declared employment 
(Buehn and Schneider, 2012; Dibben and Williams, 2012; Feld and Schneider, 
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2010; ILO, 2002, 2011; Jütting and Laiglesia, 2009; OECD, 2002; Rodgers and 
Williams, 2009; Schneider et al., 2010). The outcome was that it began to be real-
ized that if the cross-national variations in undeclared employment were going to 
be understood, then new explanations would be required. 
2.2. neo-liberal Perspective
For neo-liberal commentators, undeclared employment is extensive because those 
engaged are making a rational economic decision to voluntarily exit the declared 
economy in order to avoid the high taxes, corruption in the state system and the 
burdensome regulations that increase the cost, time and effort associated with de-
clared employment (e.g., Becker, 2004; De Soto, 1989, 2001; London and Hart, 
2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Sauvy, 1984; Small Business Council, 2004). Undeclared 
employment from this neo-liberal perspective, in consequence, is seen as more 
prevalent in nations with higher taxes and public sector corruption and greater 
state interference in work and welfare provision. The consequent solution is to 
reduce taxes, corruption and state intervention. 
2.3. Political Economy Perspective
For many political economy commentators, in contrast to neo-liberals, unde-
clared employment is not the result of too much but too little state intervention 
in work and welfare. From this perspective, undeclared employment is concep-
tualized as a tool used in the new downsizing, sub-contracting and outsourcing 
arrangements emerging under de-regulated global capitalism since this form of 
work provides businesses with a production channel to attain flexible produc-
tion, profit and cost reduction (Amin et al., 2002; Castells and Portes, 1989; 
Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; Hudson, 2005; Sassen, 1996; Slavnic, 2010). The 
outcome is that the full-employment and comprehensive formal welfare state 
that characterized the Fordist and socialist era is disappearing (Amin et al., 
2002; Fernandez-Kelly, 2006; Hudson, 2005). In its place, a new post-Ford-
ist and post-socialist regime of deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation is 
emerging (Castells and Portes, 1989; meagher, 2010; Sassen, 1996). Undeclared 
employment is thus conducted out of necessity as a last resort in the absence 
of other means of livelihood (Ahmad, 2008; Castells and Portes, 1989; Sassen, 
1996) and is more prevalent in economies in which there is less state interven-
tion in work and welfare provision in the form of active labour market policies, 
social protection and social transfers. The remedy to reduce undeclared employ-
ment is therefore to pursue greater intervention in work and welfare arrange-
ments (Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; Slavnic, 2010).
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Until now, few if any studies have evaluated the validity of these competing 
explanations. To do so, attention now turns to an analysis of the cross-national 
variations in undeclared employment across the EU-27 and whether this is corre-
lated with the various societal characteristics used by each theorisation.
3. mEThodoLogy: ExAmInIng undECLAREd EmPLoymEnT  
In ThE Eu-27
Here, the only extensive cross-national survey currently available is used, namely 
Special Eurobarometer No. 284 (Undeclared Work in the European Union), con-
ducted as part of wave 67.3 of the 2007 Eurobarometer survey (European Com-
mission, 2007a). Similar to other Eurobarometer surveys, this used a multi-stage 
random (probability) sampling method in every member state. To examine the 
prevalence of, and reasons for, undeclared employment, participants were firstly 
interviewed for their opinions and attitudes regarding undeclared employment and 
having established a rapport, questions were then asked about their acquisition of 
goods and/or services on an undeclared basis over the year prior to the survey. 
Following this, those participants in formal employment were questioned about 
whether they had received envelope wage payments from their employer, and if 
they were happy with this or would have preferred to have had their full gross 
salary declared. And finally, their participation in wholly undeclared employment 
was investigated, including their reasons for participating in this work in terms 
whether it was due to exit and/or exclusion rationales. 
To analyze the validity of the various explanations, official data sources have 
been employed wherever feasible to examine statistical indicators of the various 
societal characteristics each perspective asserts are the key drivers underpinning 
engagement in undeclared employment, such as the level of GDP per capita, taxa-
tion levels, levels of social protection and state redistribution (European Com-
mission, 2011, Eurostat, 2007, 2010, 2013a, b, c). The only indicators derived 
from unofficial data sources are the level of public sector corruption, derived from 
Transparency International’s (2013) corruption perceptions index for 2007 and 
evidence on the quality of state bureaucracy derived from the International Coun-
try Risk Guide (ICRG, 2013). 
To explore the relationship between the cross-national variations in the preva-
lence of, and reasons for, undeclared employment and the range of societal char-
acteristics these perspectives delineate as drivers, and given the small sample size 
of 27 member states and lack of necessary controls to include in a multivariate re-
gression analysis, it is only possible here to conduct bivariate regression analyzes 
of the relationship between undeclared employment and these different societal 
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characteristics that each perspective denotes as influential. As will be shown, nev-
ertheless, this produces some meaningful findings concerning the validity of the 
contrasting theories. 
4. fIndIngS: CRoSS-nATIonAL vARIATIonS In undECLAREd  
EmPLoymEnT In ThE Eu-27
To evaluate the prevalence of undeclared employment in the EU-27, firstly, the 
26,659 participants surveyed were asked whether they had undertaken wholly 
undeclared employment in the prior year and secondly, the sub-set of 11,587 par-
ticipants who were in declared employment were asked whether they had received 
an additional undeclared envelope wage from their employer in the year prior to 
the survey. To estimate the level of wholly undeclared employment, those one-off 
jobs undertaken for close social relations (e.g., kin, friends, neighbours and ac-
quaintances) for reasons related to redistributing money or helping somebody in 
need have been excluded since these are ‘paid favours’ and more akin to unpaid 
community exchange than an employment relationship. However, all other forms 
of wholly undeclared employment are included ranging from permanent full-time 
undeclared waged employment and self-employment, through to all part-time, 
temporary or short-term work regardless of its duration, just as is the case when 
analyzing the level of participation in declared employment.
The finding is that across the EU-27, 90.8% of jobs are declared, meaning that 
9.2% of all jobs held by participants in the year prior to the survey was undeclared 
employment (see table 1). Extrapolating from this, 20.6 million of the 224 mil-
lion jobs in the EU-27 would be undeclared. Undeclared employment, however, is 
not evenly distributed across the EU-27. The proportion of jobs that are declared 
ranges from 99% in Luxembourg, 97% in the UK, 96.9% in Germany and 96.5% 
in Finland to 81.3% in Poland, 76.2% in Bulgaria, 70.4% in Latvia and 64.3% in 
Romania. At first sight therefore, there appears to be an East/West regional divide 
in the EU-27 with East-Central European countries having higher levels of unde-
clared employment than Western European nations. 
To analyze this, table 1 groups member states into four EU regions: Western, 
East-Central and Southern Europe and the Nordic nations. This reveals not only 
an East-to-West but also South-to-North divide in the EU-27. In Western Europe, 
4.6% of employment is undeclared compared with 20.1% in East-Central Eu-
rope, whilst in Nordic nations, 8.4% of employment is undeclared compared with 
10.3% in Southern Europe. Employment relations on the Eastern/Southern side 
are therefore less declared than on the Western/Nordic side, although the East-to-
West divide is more marked than the South-to-North divide. 
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Table 1. Prevalence of, and reasons for, undeclared employment in EU-27
Country % of jobs that are declared
% of undeclared employment driven by:
exit exclusion both exit and exclusion
EU-27 90.8 51 46 3
Nordic nations 91.6 77 21 2
Finland 96.5 78 22 0
Sweden 92.1 67 33 0
Denmark 87.7 93 7 0
Western Europe 95.4 71 27 2
Luxembourg 99.0 – – –
UK 97.0 100 0 0
Germany 96.9 78 22 0
France 95.4 56 44 0
Ireland 93.3 67 33 0
Austria 91.4 65 35 0
Netherlands 90.3 89 8 3
Belgium 88.6 73 23 4
East-Central Europe 79.9 39 56 5
Czech Rep 93.0 58 38 4
Slovenia 91.8 75 25 0
Slovak Rep 87.0 56 44 0
Estonia 82.8 67 33 0
Hungary 82.7 50 36 14
Lithuania 81.8 53 40 7
Poland 81.3 27 66 7
Bulgaria 76.2 59 41 0
Latvia 70.4 70 30 0
Romania 64.3 23 74 3
Southern Europe 89.7 40 56 4
malta 99.0 – – –
Cyprus 94.1 50 50 0
Portugal 91.3 33 67 0
Spain 90.2 49 46 5
Greece 90.2 53 47 0
Italy 88.6 26 70 4
Source: 2007 Eurobarometer survey on undeclared work data-set.
Turning to the reasons for working undeclared in the EU-27, and in line with 
the neo-liberal and structuralist perspectives, the proportion driven by exit and 
exclusion rationales can be examined. On the one hand, those receiving under-
declared salaries (i.e., envelope wages) were asked ‘Were you happy with getting 
part of your salary without having it declared to the tax or social security authori-
ties or would you have preferred to have your total gross salary declared?’. Those 
happy with receiving under-declared salaries are delineated as participating in this 
form of undeclared employment out of choice (i.e., for ‘exit’ rationales), whilst 
those preferring it to be declared are delineated as doing so due to their lack of 
choice (i.e., for exclusion rationales). 
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On the other hand, to examine whether wholly undeclared employment was 
undertaken for exit or exclusion rationales, the responses to three survey questions 
are here analyzed: 
 – did you do this activity because you could not find a regular job?; 
 – did you do this activity because the bureaucracy/red tape to carry out a re-
gular job is too complicated?; and
 – did you do this activity because taxes and/or social security contributions 
are too high? 
Those agreeing with (1), but not (2) and (3), are delineated as driven into un-
declared employment for exclusion rationales, reflecting the political economy 
thesis that undeclared workers are necessity-driven due to their exclusion from the 
formal labour market. meanwhile, those agreeing with (2) and/or (3), but not (1), 
are delineated as participating in undeclared employment for exit rationales, thus 
reflecting the neo-liberal thesis that undeclared workers exit the formal economy 
due to high taxes and the burdensome regulations. Those agreeing with (1) and 
either or both of (2) and (3) are delineated as participating for a mixture of both 
exit and exclusion rationales. 
Examining the findings, 51% of those engaged in undeclared employment are 
driven by ‘exit’ rationales, 46% by ‘exclusion’ rationales and 3% by a combina-
tion of the two reasons. However, there are marked cross-national variations in 
the propensity to cite exclusion and exit rationales. Exit rationales are cited by 
100% of those in undeclared jobs in the UK, 93% in Denmark and 89% in the 
Netherlands, but by just 23% in Romania, 26% in Italy and 27% in Poland. Again 
therefore, there appears to be an East-to-West and North-to-South divide in the 
rationales for participation in undeclared employment with the neo-liberal thesis 
being more applicable in some nations but the political economy thesis in others. 
To analyze this, table 1 reports the European regional level results. This reveals 
that in Western Europe and Nordic nations, 71% and 77% of undeclared jobs are 
undertaken for exit rationales respectively, but just 39% in East-Central Europe 
and 40% in Southern Europe. Similarly, in Western Europe and Nordic nations, 
just 27% and 21% of undeclared jobs respectively are conducted for exclusion ra-
tionales but 56% in both East-Central Europe and Southern Europe. There is thus 
again a clear East-to-West and North-to-South divide. Participants in East-Central 
Europe and Southern Europe are largely driven by exclusion rationales, and thus 
the political economy is more applicable, whilst those in Western Europe and Nor-
dic nations are largely driven by exit rationales and thus the neo-liberal thesis is 
more relevant in these European regions. 
Taking the variations in the prevalence of, and reasons for, undeclared em-
ployment together therefore, a West-to-East and North-to-South divide is delin-
eated. There is a lower prevalence of undeclared employment that is largely of 
the exit variety in Western European and Nordic nations, and a greater prevalence 
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of undeclared employment mostly driven by exclusion rationales in East-Central 
and Southern European nations. How, in consequence, might these cross-national 
variations be explained? 
5. dISCuSSIon: EvALuATIng ThE ComPETIng ExPLAnATIonS
5.1. Evaluating the modernisation Perspective
Examining the modernisation thesis that the prevalence of undeclared employ-
ment is smaller in modern developed economies and greater in less developed 
economies, the relationship between the cross-national variations in the preva-
lence of undeclared employment and GDP per capita (European Commission, 
2011, table 3) can be analyzed. Employing Spearman’s rank correlation coeffi-
cient due to the non-parametric nature of the data, table 2 reveals a strong sig-
nificant relationship between the prevalence of undeclared employment and the 
levels of GDP per capita. The prevalence of undeclared employment is lower in 
countries with higher levels of GDP per capita. A significant relationship also ex-
ists between countries with higher levels of GDP per capita and the proportion of 
undeclared workers who do so for exit rationales. The prevalence of undeclared 
employment and proportion conducted for exclusion rationales decreases as coun-
tries become wealthier measured in terms of GDP per capita. 
Table 2. Relationship between cross-national variations in the prevalence of, and reasons for  






Reasons for undeclared 
employment  
(% conducted for exit 
rationales)
modernisation thesis:
– GDP per capita –.633** .510*
– Purchasing power standards (PPS) –.666** .510*
– Quality of state bureaucracy –.663** .521**
Neo-liberal thesis:
– Implicit tax rate on labour income .042 .062
– Public sector corruption –.635** .614**
Political economy thesis:
– State expenditure on labour market measures –.329 .178
– Social protection expenditure –.510** .368
– State redistribution via social transfers –.405** .452*
– Income distribution inequality .418* –.419*
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Source author’s elaboration.
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GDP per capita however, does not take into account the differences in costs of 
living between countries. Using purchasing power standards (PPS) to evaluate this 
relationship with undeclared employment (Eurostat, 2013a), a strong correlation 
is identified. The higher the PPS in a country, the lower is the prevalence of un-
declared employment and the more likely it is to be conducted for exit rationales.
Turning to the quality of the state bureaucracy, the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) uses a 0–4 scale to assess the quality of bureaucracy in a nation 
with 4 indicating that the quality of state bureaucracy is high and 0 that it is 
low (ICRG, 2013). member states with high quality state bureaucracy have the 
strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions 
in government services, a bureaucracy that is autonomous from political pres-
sure and an established mechanism for recruitment and training. member states 
with low quality state bureaucracy are those where a change in government is 
traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions. 
Examining the relationship between cross-national variations in the quality of the 
state bureaucracy and cross-national variations in the prevalence of, and reasons 
for, undeclared employment, a significant relationship is identified. The higher 
the quality of state bureaucracy, the less prevalent is undeclared employment and 
the more likely is such work to be conducted for voluntary exit rationales. Con-
sequently, the modernisation thesis is valid that more developed countries with 
higher levels of GDP per capita, PPS and better quality state bureaucracies are 
economies where undeclared employment is less prevalent and more likely to be 
conducted for voluntary exit rationales. Future research might analyze whether 
these relationships hold when a wider range of countries and global regions are 
analyzed. 
5.2. Evaluating neo-liberal Theory
From a neo-liberal perspective, high tax rates drive people into undeclared em-
ployment. To analyze this, cross-national variations in the average effective tax 
burden on employed labour in the form of the level of implicit tax rates (ITR) on 
labour can be analyzed. This aggregates all direct and indirect taxes paid as well 
as all employees’ and employers’ social contributions levied on employed labour 
income, and this is then divided by the total compensation paid to employees 
(Eurostat, 2010). No statistically significant correlation is identified between the 
cross-national variations in the ITR on labour and the cross-national variations in 
the prevalence of undeclared employment or the reasons for engaging in unde-
clared employment (see table 2). 
To examine the neo-liberal hypothesis that public sector corruption leads to 
undeclared employment being more prevalent due to a greater desire to exit the 
formal economy, Transparency International’s 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index 
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(CPI) explores perceptions of public sector corruption and is a composite index 
drawing on 14 expert opinion surveys (Transparency International, 2013). This 
index scores countries on a scale from zero to 10, with zero indicating high levels 
and 10 low levels of perceived public sector corruption. A strong correlation is 
found between cross-national variations in the level of public sector corruption 
and cross-national variations in the prevalence of, and reasons for, undeclared 
employment. The higher is the perceived level of public sector corruption, the 
greater is the prevalence of undeclared employment. This therefore supports the 
neo-liberal assertion that undeclared employment is an exit strategy pursued by 
workers confronted by bribes and corruption when seeking to enter or remain in 
the declared economy. However, exit rationales decrease in importance as corrup-
tion levels increase, suggesting that undeclared employment is not an outcome of 
voluntary exit as neo-liberals suggest but is more a tactic pursued by employers 
which they then impose on their undeclared workers. 
5.3. Evaluating the Political Economy Perspective
To evaluate the relationship between cross-national variations in the level of state 
intervention in work and welfare and cross-national variations in the prevalence 
of, and reasons for, undeclared employment, the first issue examined is whether 
and how state intervention in the labour market aimed at correcting disequilibria is 
correlated with undeclared employment. To achieve this, cross-national variations 
in the proportion of GDP spent by governments on interventions in the labour 
market are analyzed. This covers both actual disbursements and foregone revenue 
(reductions in taxes or social contributions normally payable), targeted at groups 
with difficulties, such as the unemployed, people in jobs but at risk of involuntary 
job loss, and inactive persons currently not part of the labour force but who would 
like a job and are disadvantaged in some manner (European Commission, 2011, 
table 3). In economies which pursue higher levels of expenditure as a proportion 
of GDP on labour market interventions, the prevalence of undeclared employment 
is smaller and more likely to be conducted for exit rationales. However, these re-
lationships are not statistically significant. 
Turning to welfare expenditure, it is similarly the case that the greater the level 
of expenditure on social protection (excluding old age benefits) as a proportion 
of GDP (European Commission, 2011, table 3), the less prevalent is undeclared 
employment and the more likely it is to be conducted for exit rationales, although 
this is not a significant relationship. Similarly, the more the state is successful in 
using direct taxes to reduce the proportion of the population at risk of poverty, the 
less prevalent is undeclared employment in economies. Examining state redis-
tribution via direct taxes, measured by the decrease in percentage points of pov-
erty (defined as the proportion of the population with an income below 60% of 
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the national median income) after social transfers (European Commission, 2011, 
table 3), a statistically significant correlation is found. The greater the reduction 
in poverty due to state redistribution via direct taxes in a nation, the less prevalent 
is undeclared employment and the less likely it is to be undertaken for exclusion 
rationales. This further supports the political economy explanation that greater 
state intervention in work and welfare arrangements reduces the prevalence of 
undeclared employment. 
The outcome is that a relationship between the level of equality in societies 
and the prevalence of undeclared employment can be identified. Analyzing the 
inequalities in the distribution of income (Eurostat, 2013c), measured by evaluat-
ing the ratio of total income (by which is meant equivalized disposable income) 
received by the 20% of the population with the highest income (top quintile) to 
that received by the 20% of the population with the lowest income (lowest quin-
tile), a significant correlation is identified between the inequalities in the distribu-
tion of income and the prevalence of undeclared employment. The more equal the 
societies in terms of the distribution of income, the less prevalent is undeclared 
employment and the less likely is undeclared employment to be conducted for 
exclusion rationales.
6. ConCLuSIonS
This article has evaluated three contrasting explanations for the cross-national 
variations in the prevalence of, and reasons for, undeclared employment in the Eu-
ropean Union, namely the modernisation thesis which views undeclared employ-
ment as more prevalent in less developed economies, the neo-liberal thesis which 
portrays undeclared employment as more prevalent in economies where high tax-
es, corruption and too much state interference leads workers to choose to exit the 
formal economy, and the political economy perspective that represents undeclared 
employment as more prevalent in countries with inadequate state intervention to 
protect workers which drives workers to engage in undeclared employment due to 
their exclusion from declared work and state welfare provision. 
Analyzing the modernisation thesis, the finding is that wealthier modern econ-
omies where GDP per capita, purchasing power standards and the quality of state 
bureaucracy are higher, undeclared employment is less prevalent and such work 
is mostly undertaken out of choice. No evidence, however, is found to support the 
neo-liberal assertion that higher tax rates led to a greater prevalence of undeclared 
employment. However, greater levels of public sector corruption are strongly cor-
related with a greater prevalence of undeclared employment, albeit not due to the 
voluntary exit of workers as suggested by neo-liberals but more due to employers 
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exiting the declared economy and then imposing undeclared employment rela-
tionships on their employees. Turning to the neo-liberal thesis that greater state 
intervention in work and welfare provision results in the greater prevalence of 
undeclared employment, little evidence is found to support this assertion. Instead, 
the opposite is the case. As the political economy perspective suggests, a sig-
nificant correlation is identified between greater intervention in welfare provision 
and undeclared employment. Those nations with higher levels of social protection 
expenditure, state redistribution via social transfers and greater equality in the dis-
tribution of income, have lower levels of undeclared employment and such work 
is more commonly conducted out of choice. 
Nations where undeclared employment is less prevalent and conducted mostly 
out of choice therefore, are wealthier, more developed, less corrupt and more 
equal economies where tax rates are higher and there are higher levels of so-
cial protection and more effective redistribution via social transfers. The clear 
theoretical implication therefore, is that no one existing theoretical explanation 
suffices. Instead, previous theorisations need to be synthesized. Here, therefore, 
a ‘neo-modernization’ theorisation is proposed which recognizes the validity of 
the modernisation thesis that GDP per capita, purchasing power standards and the 
quality of state bureaucracy, the neo-liberal argument that state corruption and the 
political economy explanation that state intervention in work and welfare provi-
sion are all strongly correlated with cross-national variations in the prevalence 
of, and reasons for, undeclared employment. Indeed, this certainly explains the 
higher levels of undeclared employment undertaken more for exclusion rationales 
in Southern and East-Central European countries, which are generally less devel-
oped and equal societies with higher rates of public sector corruption and lower 
levels of labour market intervention, social protection and state redistribution via 
social transfers compared with Western European and Nordic nations. 
These findings also have clear implications for protecting workers in the un-
declared economy and tackling undeclared employment. The advocacy by neo-
liberals of lower taxes and de-regulation is not correlated with lower levels of 
undeclared employment. Instead, lower levels of undeclared employment are cor-
related with the quality of state bureaucracy, lower public sector corruption and 
higher social protection expenditure, greater use of redistribution via social trans-
fers and more equal societies. Unlike previous literature on tackling undeclared 
employment that has focused upon whether punitive deterrence measures or more 
enabling measures that smooth the transition from undeclared to declared work 
need to be used (OECD, 2012; Williams and Windebank, 1995), this article has 
thus vey tentatively shown that broader societal characteristics around work and 
welfare arrangements are also correlated and can no longer be ignored. 
Several caveats however, are required regarding these findings. Firstly, care is 
required not to incur the risk of an ecological fallacy, namely deducing the nature 
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of individuals from inferences for the group to which those individuals belong. 
Secondly, care is required not to infer causation from the correlations identified. 
Thirdly, this paper has only conducted bivariate regression analysis. In future 
studies, multivariate regression analysis is required to determine how important 
each characteristic is to the outcome whilst controlling for the other characteris-
tics. This will then enable an evaluation of whether each relationship holds as well 
as which are most strongly correlated with undeclared employment. However, this 
will still not allow causality to be determined.
In sum, this evaluation of the cross-national variations in the prevalence of, 
and reasons for, undeclared employment in the EU-27 has resulted in a new theo-
rization that synthesizes different elements of the existing theories. Whether this 
neo-modernisation thesis remains valid both in the current crisis period, when 
other global regions are incorporated into the analysis as well as when longitudi-
nal data within individual nations are examined, now needs to be evaluated. If this 
article encourages such research, as well as recognition and further investigation 
of the potential need for a wider approach towards improving the work condi-
tions of those in undeclared employment and tackling such work, then it will have 
achieved its intention.
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